The foundation for security enforcement is access control. Resources must be protected against access by unauthorized entities. Furthermore, authorized entities must be prevented from accessing resources in inappropriate ways. A major challenge to the developer of an access control policy is to provide users the flexibility to protect their resources as they see fit; system policies that am inconsistent with user needs are inadequate. In particular, systems that enforce a single, hard-coded policy cannot satisfy the needs of all users.
INTRODUCTION
One of tbe goals of the Distributed Trusted Operating System (DTOS) program is to investigate an approach for developing au operating system microkemel that supports a wide range of security policies. Rather than simply following the guidelines in the Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria (KSEC) [ 121 and implementing Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Multilevel Security (MIS), the DTOS microkemel must provide a framework ' This work was suppxted in patt by the Maryland F'mcurement Office, contract MDA904-93C- 4209 and was performed in cooperation with mscarchers at the Information Security Computer Science Rcseaxh Division of the Department of Jkfense.
that encompasses these policies as well as others. The DTOS pro gram is exploring this framework through prototyping and study efforts.
Given that secure system developments have traditionally focused on implementing a particular security policyp a natural question to ask is why we think supporting a wide range of policies is important. One reason is that different sites need to protect against different threats. A site controlling a nuclear reactor needs to protect the integrity of the processes and data used to run the reactor. A site containing proprietary or confidential data needs to protect that data from unauthorized disclosure. A site managing medical records needs to protect the records both from unauthorized disclosure and inappropriate modification. While access control policies are appropriate for each of these examples, a different type of access control policy might be desired for each. Policies such as Type Enforcement [3] and Clark-Wdson [S] can be used to address integrity concerns. Other policies such as MIS, Chinese-Wall [4] , and ORCON [lo] can be used to address confidentiality concerns. However, no single policy is appropriate for all cases.
A second reason for supporting a wide range of policies is that the set of threats against which each site must protect is constantly evolving. Some threats that am of concern today might not be of concern next year. Furthermore, the system must protect against new threats that exploit previously unknown security flaws in existing applications and security flaws introduced through new applications. A system that is hard coded to enforce a single security policy will have much more trouble adapting to the evolving set of threats than a systemsupporting a flexible security architecture. This is especially tme when high assurance is a goal. Then, time is required to model the system, state the policy, and perform the assurance analysis. By basing the assurance for a specific site on assurance performed on a policy neutral system. the time required to assure the final system can be greatly reduced.
Without policy flexibility, users must either make due with a system that does not provide exactly the type of protection they would like or must wait until someone develops a system that does. Given that the development of a secure system takes a significant amount of time, the threats against which a user needs protection typically will have changed between the time that development begins and the time a new system is completed. Thus, users are constantly forced to make due with the policies provided by existing systems.
In Section 2 we describe the DTOS architecture for a policy flexible system, and in Section 3 we describe the method used in DTOS to develop a flexible, policy-neutral access control policy. Section 4 presents two examples of the use of the architecture to implement a high-level policy (MIS and Clark-Wdson), and Section 5 discusses the range of policy flexibility supported by DTOS. 
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR POLICY FLEXIBILITY
The DTOS security architecture [ 111, depicted in Figure 1 , supports policy flexibility by separating the making of policy decisions from the enforcement of those decisions. The policy decisions are made by security servers. A security servera is simply a process executing in the system that makes decisions based on a set of security rules. The enforcement of these decisions is performed by each system component managing the objects protected by the policy. A manager is the only subject able to directly access some collection of objects that it manages. It receives a sequence of requests from various client subjects to perform actions on its objects and must decide, based on its current state (possibly augmentedby new access decisions received from a security server), whether or not to carry out tbat request.
The manager receives requests from other subjects,including the Security Server, and it sends accessdecisionrequests to the Security Server. The Security Server sends responses to the access decision requests to the manager. The manager and Security Server each have internal data that records their processing state. The Security Server's data includes adecisionpoiicy which is the data and/orcode governing the Security Server's policy decisions. The manager's data includes an enforcementpolicy specifying the required access decisions that the manager associates with each manager request and a set of retained decisions specifying access decisions that the Security Server has previously made which have been cached by the manager.
When requesting a security decision, the manager must provide information indicating the subject that is requesting the service and the object upon which the service is to operate. Thus, it suffices for an object manager to associate security information with each object that it manipulates as a result of client requests. The process manager4 manages the subjects and therefore associates security information with each subject. In addition to providing the security information for the accessing subject and for the entity acted upon, the manager also provides the type of operation that is desired. The operation type is specified by a permission name. In response, the Security Server provides a set of decisions, called an access vector, indicating which operations the accessing subject may perform on 3Wc use "a security s.erver" when referring to security scrve~~ in general and "the Sccutity Server" when xfening to the security ~crver pnxent in a given instance of DTOS.
?he pmcess managerin DTDS is the Mesh microkernel.
the entity. Although the Security Server could simply respond with a yes/no answer as to whether the requested operation is permitted. WC return an access vector for efficiency. By caching the returned access vector and consulting the cache before requesting decisions from the Security Server, the manager can avoid interactions with the Security Server when the necessary information is in the cache. 5 The security information that a security server needs in order to make access decisions depends on the particular policy implemented by that security server. For example, a security server enforcing an MLS policy makes its decisions based on the security levels of the accessing subject and the accessed entity. However, having the manager provide security levels to the Security Server would be incorrect since it would hard code into the manager that each entity has a security level. To be truly policy flexible, the manager cannot contain any policy specific iuformation. Thus, the manager associates a label called a security identifier (SID) with each manager object. The Security Server defines a mapping between SIDs and securily contexts. This mapping defines the meaning of each SID. In the case of an h4LS policy. a security context might consist of simply a security level. In the case of a Type Enforcement [3] palicy, the security context associated with a subject SID might contain only a domain while the securit context associated with an object SID might contain only a type. % The level of indirection provided by SlDs allows the same manager to he used regardless of how the Security Server interprets SlDs and makes access decisions. The Security Server provides an interface allowing managers and other tasks to map SlDs to their associated contexts and vice versa.7 Of course, a security server may restrict access to this information if this is required by its policy goals.
There are several types of policy involved in a systemusing this architecture. The first is the high-level system policy. Some examples are MIS, Clark-Wilson and ORCON. This is the policy that would be hard-ceded into a system using a traditional architecture not designed for policy flexibility. In the DTOS architecture this policy emerges from the interaction of the manager and the Security Server, each of which is implementing its own policy.
%c interaction between the manager and Security Server in DlTX is slightly morccomplicated than that described hae. Forexample. there are also f&lit& for&e Security Serverto instruct tbc manager not to cache certain parts of the returned access vectors and to flush vectors from tbc cache. Such features are nexssaty to support policies in which BCCCBSCS can be twoked.
65pe JZ?nfor.xmentconImls subject-to-subjacte on a domain-todonuinbtis and subject-toabject BCCCSS on adorn&-to-typebasis.
Thus. the secuity information needed to make decisions consists of domains and types.
'The developerof any puticularsccurity server must d&de whether it is important to the goals of the policy that SlDs be cryptographically pmtectcd (or even opaque) fmm interpretation by other taska Such protection is not quinxJ by the architecture. However. to maintain policy-neutrality, all managers should be written with the BSsumption that SIDs are opaque. If this guideline is violated. the manager will not work correctly with any security server that dow not supply transparrnt SlDs with the same strucbJm.
The manager's enforcementpolicy defines the security requirements goveming when the manager provides service. In particular, this policy identifies the points in the manager processing at which a security decision needs to be obtained. It also indicates which security decision is needed at each point. This policy defines what it means for the manager to enforce policy decisions made by the Security Server. It will be the same no matter what decision policy is supplied by the security server. Each manager is trusted to correctly implement its enforcement policy.
The Security Server's decision policy defines the security mquirements on how the security server makes access decisions. Since the intent is to allow different security servers to make security decisions differently, them is no single security server policy. However, there is a welldefined interface that the managers expect each security server to implement. The main requirement on the interface is simply that whenever the Security Server sends the results of a security decision, the results am consistent with the decision policy that the Security Server is imp1ementing.s Although a manager could be any of a variety of components including a hle server enforcing access decisions made on files and an application enforcing access decisions on application specific data, the remainder of this paper considers only the enforcement by the DTOS microkernel of access decisions made on microkernel subjects and objects. To explore the use of the DTOS architecture, a primary focus of the DTOS program has been to modify the Mach microkernel to serve as a manager in that architecture. In doing so, we have added suplxat to Mach for a wide range of access control policies. This has been accomplishedby inserting control logic in the microkernel. The processing of each microkemel request has been modified to request a security decision by a security server before providing a service. We have also implemented a prototype user-space security server that makes these security decisions for the microkernel. The security-enhanced microkemel and the prototype Security Server have been released to a number of sites for use in research on secure systems. Some sites am developing their own security server while others are developing additional policy-flexible applications. Additional information on the implementation of both the microkemel and the Security Server can be found in [ 111.
Although the work described hem deals with enhancing Mach to function as a policy-neutral object manager, this is merely an example. The architecture is general enough to be applied not only to other microkemels but to a wide variety of managers. 3 .1 APPROACHES TO POLICY DEVELOPMENT Traditionally, there have been two related but distinct approaches to developing security policies. The first approach, the threat-based approach, is to identify the system threats that are of concern and developrequirements that address the threats. The second approach, the criteria-based approach is to interpret a set of requirements specified by an evaluation criteria document (such as [12] ) for the target system. The relation between the two approaches is that in the second approach it is assumed that the developers of the evaluation criteria have already identified all of the relevant threats.
The criteria-based approach is infeasible for DTOS due to the goal to support a wide range of policies. Regardless of whether an evaluation criteria document contains MIS, integrity, or availabiity requirements, there is always the possibility that the user of 'A security server may also provide specialized interfaces for use by particular managers.
a DTOS system will want to enforce some other type of security. Consequently, the DTOS policy must provide a framework in which a variety of policies can be supported rather than simply interpreting requirements in au existing evaluation criteria.
Thus, the DTOS policy development is threat-based. However, the threats identified are of a different nature than those traditionally identified. When developing the policy for a system that is intended to enforce a single policy, the identified threats typically are specific to that policy. For example, while covert channels [12] are a threat with respect to MIS policies, they are typically not a threat with respect to integrity policies. Since the DTOS policy is intended to provide a framework that supports a wide variety of policies, the threats identified for DTOS must be policy independent.
The intent is for usem to be able to counter threats to their systems by appropriately conliguring DTOS. Furthermore, as the set of threats against which a site must protect evolves, administrators shouldbe able toreconfigureDl7X toaddressthenew set of threats. This requires controls to be placed on essentially all services. For example, DTOS must control the setting of the scheduling priority for a thread since some users will want to protect against service denial to user threads. Although the denial of service threat might be of little concern to most users, the possibility that some users might be concerned suggests viewing it as a real threat. Since providing protection against every conceivable threat is impossible, a judgement call must be made on the set of threats that am of concern.
The approach taken in defining the enforcement policy for the DTOS microkernel is to view any access of the microkernel state as being a potential threat. By viewing each access as a potential threat and providing appropriate control mechanisms, the goal of supporting multiple policies can be achieved.g 3.2 POLICY DEVELOPMENT Although developing a policy for a system intended to be "policy neutral" seems paradoxical, the "paradox"is largely resolved by the separation of security enforcement from security decision making. In this section we describe a process for defming the hardcoded enforcement policy in the manager. We use the DTOS microkernel enforcement policy as an example. In Section 4 we give examples of how to de6ne a decision policy in a security server to achieve a given high-level policy. The process we have used for defming the enforcement policy of the DTOS microkernel consists of the following primary steps:
1. Identify the services that are provided by the microkemel, 2. Relate each microkemel service to one or mom access decisions that must be obtained for the service to be performed.
IDENTIFYING SERVICES
To perform the lirst step we determine the following information about the system: l the microkernel data structums, and 0 the requests that clients may make to access those structures.
Wtth this information in hand we proceed to identify the services provided by the microkernel that need to be controlled. We diitinguish the following two classes of service: transformation and invocation. A iransfomation service is one that is defined in terms of a change to one or mom of the data structums that comprise the system state. For example, one component of the DTOS system state is ezisting-tasks, the set of existing tasks. Since any change to a set involves adding or removing elements (or 'See the DlDS Gcnerali2u.l Security Ftalicy Specification [ 141 formomon supporting multiple policies both), these are two natural services to associate with this component. Consideration is then given to whether a threat is posed by the ability to add or remove elements from this set. The ability to remove an element poses a denial of service threat. Thus, we define a service, TerminatesTaak(task) to be any modification to the contents of the system state that results in task being removed from ezisting-tasks.
Any system transition in which an element is removed from etisting-tasks is an instance of this transformation service. As another example, each task has au associated priority that determines the initial priority of its threads. The service SetsTaakPriority(task) is de&4 as a modification to the system state that results in the priority of task changing. The AllocatesReadRegion( task, page-index) service is delined as a state change in which a new page is allocated at page-index for task and the protectious of that page include read access. The Allocates WriteRegion( task,page-index) and AllocatesExecuteRegion(task,page-index) services denote the allocation of pages with write and execute access, respectively.
In all of these examples, a service is equated with a charactexizing property of state transitions. Any state transition satisfying the characterizing property is considered to have provided the service. Conversely, a state transition that does not satisfy the characterizing property is considered not to have provided the service."
Not all microkemel requests alter the modeled state of a microkemel entity. Some of them only observe the modeled state of some entity, and these requests cannot easily be characterized as performing transformation services. For example, consider the Mach taskinfo request which returns information on the state of a specified task. Since this operation simply observes data, no trace is left in the contents of the system state to indicate when the operation has beenperfonned. For each such request we define an invocation service.' Any system transition in which one of these requests is invoked is au instance of the corresponding invocation service.
Unlike a transformation service, which may be performed by multiple requests, au invocation service is associated with exactly one Equest. Since transformation services address the ways in which subjects can modify the system state, they address primarily denial of service and integrity concerns. In contrast. invocation services address ways in which subjects can observe objects, thus focusing on confidentiality concerns.
STATING THE POLICY
The second step in the development of an enforcement policy is to deiine the relationship between the manager's services and the accessdecision computations that must be requested of the Security Server by the manager. The manager enforcement policy must indicate which accessdecisionsneed tobe checkedbefore providing each scrvicc." Thus, the enforcement policy must map each service to a triple consisting of the SIDs of the subject and object involved together with the permission requested. For example, the DTOS microkemel's enforcement policy maps the service SetaTaakPriority(taak) to the permis-"One issue that might be taken with the t& priority example is that a request that sets a task's priority to the same value BS the task% current priority will not be recognizedasa SetsTasWriority setvice. As tbercqucstiseff~tivelyano~p,we maintainthattbercisnoncedtoviewthercquestasp~vidingascrvicc.
Ofcoutse.there SIX also covert channel issues that must be addwazd when the permission checks are being implemented. Cam must be taken that if the service is disallowed an "insticient pctission" status is rctumcd even when the operation would be a no-op. Otherwise. if aclient c doesnot havepennissiontoobtainaserYice SetsTcsLPriority(t,). then c could determine the priority of tl by attempting to set tl 's priority and observing whether the ram status indicates "success"or"insuflicient petition': (Rrmition checks in DTOS arc implemented in a way that prevents this channel.) "Them are B few Mach rquwts (e.g.. task+zL~pe&Lport) for which multiple invocationscrvicesarcdefined.Thisallowsfiner-grainadcontroldependinguponwhich system state informationis mquested as specified in the parametersof the Fcquest.
'2Rccell that we allow the possibility that the result of an asa decision requestis cached. If the msult of a required wxss decision can be obtained from tbe cache. then the microkernel will not make a new request for that access decision.
Requirements on client to task Accesses 'lkansibrmation Service Required Permission SetsTaakPriority(task)
Change-task-priority TerminateaTask(taak)
Terminate-task Table 1 : Tabular Policy Example sion Change-task-priority and the SIDs for the client13 and task (the target). In other words, the microkemel policy requixes that the client have Change-taakqriority permission to task before providing the service SetaTaakPriority(task) to the client.
Similarly, the DTOS enforcement policy maps the service TerminateaTask(task)
to the permission Terminate-task and the SIDs for the client and task. The services AllocateaReadRegion( taak,page-index), Allocates WriteRegion(taak,page-index) and AllocateaExecuteRegion(task,page-indez) are mapped to Have-read, Have-write and Have-execute permission, respectively, and to the SIDs for task and the indicated page.
The DTOS enforcement policy is stated in two different forms. To provide a clear, precise statement, the policy is formal&d in the Z specification language [la] .
This requires formalizing the system state and the transformation services.
Then the enforcement policy can be formalized as a relation between the services, the permissions and the SIDs. The expression kernelAllows( taaksid(client), task-portsid( task)) denotes the set of permissions allowed from the SID of the client to the object SID of the target task. It thus models the access vector associated with the pair of SLDs. The formalization of the requirements on SetaTaakPriority is as follows: V Transition; task : TASK l SetsTaakPriority + Change-task-priority E kernel-alZows(tasksid(client), Bask-portlrid( task))
Experience has shown that most people are uncomfortable reading such mathematical statements. Consequently, formal security policies are to a great extent ignored by all but formal methods advocates. This is unfortunate since people such as systemdevelopers, evaluators. accrediters, andusersneed tounderstandthe system policy. After all. the distinguishing characteristic of a secure system is that it has a policy that it is assured to satisfy.
The DUOS enforcement policy addresses this by providing a tabular representation of the policy as well as the formal Z statement. Tables 1 and 2 contain brief excerpts that illustrate the tabular representation of the policy.
The heading of a table indicates the SIDs that should be used for the permission checks specified in the table. Each row of a table identifies a binding between a service and a permission. One such table is de6ned for each pair of entity types for which there are associated permission checks. A similar approach is used for invocation services. The only difference is that the tables associate permissions with DTOS requests instead of transformation services. The system developers have found the tables to be a convenient representation of the policy. This has allowed the people coding the security checks to obtain a better understanding of the security checks than if the policy was documented only in the Z specification language.
"lhe client is the tzxk that initiated a tquest for service. Have-write AIIocatesEzecuteRegion(task,page-indez)
Have-execute To help maintain consistency between the enforcement policy, the design documents and the microkemel itself, we have written tools that automatically extract information on services and permissions from underlying data tables. These tools analyze the data tables to produce the following:
The policy requirements (both the formal Z versions and the tables shown above) included in the enforcement policy document,
The lists of permissions needed to invoke each request (there may be several),
The list of permissions associated with each class of object, and C files defining the permissions used in the microkemel and the checks to be performed.
These tools have proved useful in maintaining consistency between the assurance and implementation efforts as the system evolved.
Although the tabular representation of the policy has been quite useful, it is incomplete without the definitions of each of the services. In the DTOS approach, the service definitions are given informally in English and formally in Z. Although the Z formalization could be omitted, some benefits have been achieved from the formalization. First, the formal dehnitions are much mom precise than the informal ones. This additional precision is especially useful in capturing some of the more subtle aspects of the system such as the transfer of capabilities. The lack of precision in informal detinitions can lead to inconsistencies between how the security requirements am interpreted by the people implementing the systemversus the people analyzing the system. Second, the formalization of the policy has allowed other tools to be used in the development of the policy. For example, a parser can be used to check the syntax and typing of the mquimments. In particular, referencing a service that has not been formally defined results in an undefjned function being reported when the formal policy statement is generated and parsed. This has actually cccurred on the DTOS program when systemimplementors have added new services to the tables. In these cases, parsing the formal policy identifies that the new services still need to be formally defined.
EVALUATION OF THE APPROACH
The two-step process described here was relatively straightforward to apply to DTOS. The microkemel documentation describes the system data structures and microkemel requests from which the service definitions are derived. The approach worked well for the initial development of the policy as well as for the incorporation of system components that were added later. Having a well-defined process for identifying the services is much more desirable than using an ad hoc approach. Since there is nothing Mach-specific to this approach, it is of use to other secure system developments, too. This includes operating system and application developments as well as other microkernels. The only assumption made by the approach is that the systemuses the client-server paradigm.
We note that it would be possible to define one or more invocation services for each system request and not dehne any transformation services. This would eliminate the need to model the system state in the enforcement policy specification. However, we prefer the use of transformation services whenever possible because requirements based on them provide general enforcement statements. A transformation service defines a state transition that might be provided by multiple system requests. For these cases, detining the security requirements in terms of a common transformation service ensures a more coherent policy. Rather than a separate permission checkbeing specified for each individual request providing the service, a single permission is globally associated with the service regardless of what requests ate implemented in the system. This has the following advantages: In contrast, the invocation services control the invocation of requests rather than the providing of services. A requirement that a client have get-task-info permission to a task in order to invoke the task-info request on that task places no restrictions on other ways in which the client can obtain information about the task. To perform higher level reasoning about which tasks "know" a given piece of information for a particular task, one must first identify all of the requests that return that information. Then, the permissions associated with each of these requests must be analyzed to ensure that the policy is satisfied.
However, even for transformation services, it is still necessary at some point to determine which requests provide the transformation service. In particular, the system developers will need to determine which portions of the code provide a given service so that the access decision requests requited by the enforcement policy can be included. Thus, while transformation services have advantages, they might complicate arguments that the implementation obeys the enforcement policy.
The number of permissions detined in DTOS is much greater than those defined for other systems. For example, most MLS systems reduce the set of permissions to read and write. In DTOS, there am currently about 150 different microkemel permissions. Not coincidentally, there are approximately 150 tnicrokemel calls in Mach. Thus, the large set of permissions is necessary to support tine-grained control. For example, there are different types of "read" accesses in Mach that a given policy might wish to differentiate. limo such read accesses are a read a task's address space, and l read a task's IPC name space by copying a port right from the task.
Since the goal of DTOS is to support a wide range of policies, a large set of permissions is necessary. Otherwise, DTOS will not be able to support system policies that require fine-gramed control. Fine-grainedcontrol is very closely linked to the concept of least privilege. An enabling design principle for secure systems is to limit the privileges held by each subject to the minimum required. Then, the system decision policy can be relied upon to prohibit the subject from performing unwanted operations. Thii allows the majority of the assurance analysis for the subject to focus on demonstrating that the subject correctly performs the operations that it is permitted to pXf0l-Jl-l.
The large number of permissions raises two concerns: l the complexity of inserting code to check so many permissions, and l the effect on performance of checking so many permissions. In DTOS, most microkernel calls require only a single permission check, andmost of these permissionchecks can be done at the same point in the code before processing of the request is dispatched to the individual processing routines. This resolves the first concern to a large extent To address the second concern, we implemented an access vector cache in the microkernel. To reduce cache searching, pointers from key data stmctures to associated cache entries am maintained by the microkernel. Heavy use of Mach send-once rights reduces the effectiveness of this secondary caching mechanism (the pointers). A few preliminary timing studies have been performed, but they are not sufficient to draw solid conclusions. They suggest that the impact on performance is determined largely by the effectiveness of the caching scheme. That is, if access vectors am easily available, permission checking does not have a significant effect on performance. The data are probably obscured by other factors such as paging performance and page alignment of microkemel code as well as disk fragmentation and contention. See [ll] for more information on the implementation and the performance tests.
EXAMPLE SECURITY SERVERS
A security server has complete freedom to make each security decision in whatever manner it wants. The particular high-level policy enforced by the system is a function of the decision policy implemented by the Security Server and the enforcement policy implemented by a manager. One possible decision policy grants all permissions. If we combine such a security server with the Mach microkemel, the resulting system would be essentially equivalent to vanilla Mach. This is, of course, not very interesting from a security standpoint. In this section we give a brief sketch of two decision policies for DTOS that are mom interesting with regard to security. When combined with the DTOS microkemel, the first example implements a high-level policy consisting of MLS with Typ Enforcement, and the second implements the Clark-Wilson integrity policy [5] . We have also investigated the ORCON policy [lOI.
MLS WITH TYPE ENFORCEMENT
The only security server currently included in Secure Computing's DTOS release is one that performs level-based and type enforcement security checks [7] . This security server l maps each subject SlD to a leveldomain pair, l maps each object SID to a level-type pair, and l makes security decisions based on the levels, domains, and typs associated with the SlDs provided by the microkernel according to the usual level dominance and type enforcement conventions.
CLARK-WILSON
The Clark-W&on integrity policy [S] is concerned with the correctness of data and the prevention of fraud rather than the prevention of disclosure. The data items that are to be protected are called constrained da& items (CDIs). The primary way in which CDL comctness is protected is by allowing CDIs to be modified only by certain programs, called transformation procedures (TF's), that have been certified to take the set of CDIs from one valid state to another. (Validity is defined in some application-specific way.) Each TP is certified to manipulate only certain sets of CDIs in a single execution. Prevention of fraud is furthered by providing mechanisms for the separation of duty. A user u is allowed to modify a CDI, c, only if there exists a set of CDIs, S. and a TP, t, such that 0 c is an element of S, l u modifies c by executing t, l u is certified to execute t to modiiy the CDls S. Consider a check-writing program that requires a purchase order to be entered into the system before a check will be printed. With the above requirement, we can prevent the person who can run the check-writing program from also running the equipment purchasing program. In this way no single person can produce a purchase order, discard it, and then write a check to pay for an item which is never ordered. Fraud then requires at least two people conspiring t0gether.l'
In defining the decision policy of a Clark-Wdson security server the primary consideration is the maintenance of a history for each Tp execution. Each process is assigned a unique subject SlD (and thus a unique subject context)."
A subject context indicates the user in whose name the process is executing and the TP that the process is executing. Every time a process p, executing a TR t, is granted write access for the first time to any CD1 cl, this event is recorded iu the Security Server. Let CDI-history(p) denote the set of all CDIs for which p has been granted write permission. When p requests write access to a CD1 ca, the Security Server checks the CD1 history associated with p. Write. permission for ca is granted only if { ca} U CDI-history(p) is a subset of some set 5'1 of CDIs that TP t is certified to manipulate and some set Sa of CDIs that the user is certitied to manipulate via t. In this way the Security Server ensures that granting p write access to ca will not allow p to manipulate a set of CDIs in violation of the ClarkWilson constraints. This example decision policy shows that the architecture can suppon dynamic policies.
RANGE OF POLICY FLEXIBILITY
The example decision policies in Section 4 demonstrate some of the flexibility of the DTOS microkemel enforcement policy. In this section we discuss in more general terms the capabilities and limitations of the enforcement policy in supporting high-level policy flexibility.
We have aheady seen an example of a decision policy that pro vides a dynamic policy that is sensitive to the history of granted permissions. DTOS can also support dynamic policies that are environment-sensitive. For example, DTOS could be used to implement a time-of-day policy in a bank where different decision policies are used during banking and non-banking hours. This can be achieved by writing a security server that monitors the system "For brevity, we have omitted some of the rcquinmentsof Clark-Wilson. Tkse reouirementsareconsidendin 1141. 'aThecumntvemionof D?DSdownotadequa~lysupportthiaone-lo6nerelation-ship between subjects and SIh It can be obtained but may require modifications to many plograms. include some that are not secwity wxre. Of course. the inadequate support is not a concern if it is acceptable to view all pmcwith tbc same SID as king the same. logical "p-".
clock and alters its method of making decisions at the appropriate times. DTOS also supports both transitive and intransitive decision policies. A transitive policy is one where if a subject A can modify an object dA and if a subject B can detect the modifications made by A to dA and can itself modify a data item dB. then A can ako modify dB . Any policy that does not satisfy this constraint for all subjects and objects is intransitive.
As observed in Footnote 15, DTOS does not adequately support a one-to-one relationship between processes and SIDs. A second limitation is that the DTOS microkemel does not send the parameters of a request to the Security Server. This prevents the implementation of certain policies. For example, suppose someone wishes to implement a policy that allows each task ti to set the priority of a task ta to any value p such that min-pri(tr, t2) 5 p < maz-pri(tl, t2) where min-pri and maz-pri am functions that map a pair of tasks to a priority. To support this type of high-level policy, the microkernel would have to send the desired priority to the Security Server as part of the access decision request. This effectively defines a unique permission (and service) for each possible value of a task's priority. The DTOS enforcement policy does not support this level of granultity.
Another limitation results from the fact that all access decision requests are in terms of a pair of SIDs. It would probably be useful to allow access decision requests with mom than two SIDs. For example, we might want to control port requests in Mach based upon a SID-triple containing the client, the target port and the task receiving from the target port. As another example, a Clark-Wdson decision policy could probably be implemented with much less history information if the Security Server interface allowed a process to request access to an entire set of CDIs in one interaction.
DTOS allows the Security Server to specify that an access decision is non-cachable and to request that a decision be removed from the microkemel's cache. However, in the first several releases of DTOS. because of the way in which memory access is controlled in Mach, both of these abilities had no effect on read, write and execute permissions. This limited the ability of DTOS to support policies that must retract permissions that have already been granted. '6 We note that this does not make the system insecure, it only limits the policy flexibility supported by the DTOS microkernel.
Obviously, this permission retraction problem applies only to the DTOS microkernel and does not affect any other manager that might be used in a DTOS system. Furthermore, the other limitations discussedin this section really only apply to the microkernel and the current Security Server. A new security server could allow an arbitrary number of SIDs or additional parameter information to be sent in a decision request. If Clark-Wilson CDIs were managed by a file server rather than the microkernel, then the file server could request access to a set of CDL5 in a single interaction. We also point out that each manager is responsible for dehning and enforcing its own policy. A security server can be written or extended to make policy decisions for any such manager. Thus, an MIS DBMS acting as the manager for database objects can have its own enforcement policy dealing with tuples, attributes and relations. A security server could be defined to supply access vectors instructing the MIS DBMS on which operations are to be allowed and which rejected. 6 COMPOSABILITY A question to be answered in any system with the DTOS amhitecture is whether the interaction of a manager and security server, each following its own policy, guarantees that the system as a whole enforces the high-level system policy. We are using composability t%x problem is that Mach caches pmtcctions in the page table, and removing permisionsfmm the axes-s vactorcachc hss no effect on the page. table. This problem was lrcmedied in the October 1!3!36DlDS release by having the micmkemel walk the theory [l, 151 to perform this analysis [6] . To do so we first specify for each component (i.e., the manager and the Security Server) the component's behavior and the assumptions the component makes about the actions of its environment including the other compo nents of the system and the environment of the entire system. In both cases, we focus on safety properties. After showing that no component violates the environmental assumptions of any other component, we compose the two specifications by taking their conjunction.
Using this method we can analyze access control policies such as simple security, the *-property and integrity. The advantage of applying composability analysis to the system is that we need demonstrate the correct implementation of tbe enforcement policy in the manager only once. When a new Security Server is developed, its decision policy and the composition of this Security Server with the manager must be analyzed. However, any analysis that has aheady been performed on the manager can be reused. We expect the manager to normally be much larger and more complicated than the Security Server, so most of the analysis is in fact reused. [ 131 proposes the use of rule-based policies to obtain policy flexibility. Lie the DTOS separation of manager and security server, this allows the system policy to be altered without changing the manager. The way in which the rules in a rule-based policy are interpreted by an object manager is roughly equivalent to what we call an enforcement policy. Abrams et al. [2] presents a framework (GFAC) for studying and constructing access control policies. An access control policy is viewed as rules expressed by authorities in terms of access control information and context. Much of the information in Section 5 regarding the range of policy flexibility in DTOS came from an effort similar to the GFAC work to categorize policies according to what they require of the enforcement policy and the interface between the manager and security server. Hosmer [8, 9] considers a Decider-Enforcer architecture in which the Decider may incorporate multiple policies. These policies are related via metapolicies which capture the similarities between policies and the ways in which their decisions may be combined when they are being used in the same Decider.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper describes the approach used to develop a policy-neutral enforcement policy for the DTOS microkemel. The approach is clarified through small examples of its application to DTOS. This paper also provides examples of the combination of that enforcement policy with a decision policy to implement a system with a desired high-level system policy. Overall, the approach seems quite effective. The policy developed provides a fine degree of control which can be used for both confidentiality and integrity policies. The approach has also allowed the policy development to be mom closely integrated with the system implementation by using a tabular representation of the policy. Tools have been developed to maintain consistency between the assurance and implementation efforts as the policy evolves.
Although we have presented a process for systematically developing an enforcement policy for a policy-neutral system, this process is not entirely objective. Choices must frequently be made regarding the level of granularity of the services. For example, others might choose to split the SetsToskPriority(tasl;) service into two services: IncreasesTaskPriority( task) and Decreases TaskPriority( task). This would provide fmer control by allowing, for example, a task to have permission to increase a second task's priority but not decrease the priority. Some users might want even tiner-grained control such as that described in Section 5 with regard to specific ranges of allowed priorities.
At the other end of the spectrum is the question of whether other parts of the DTOS enforcement policy have an unnecessarily fiue grain. That is, are there service distinctions in DTOS that no policy will ever need to use? Artificial examples can be created of policies that require each of the permissions that we have defined. However, the real question is what permissions wiJl people actually need to support the policies they want to implement. Our current approach for selecting the granularity is stih rather ad hoc and is based upon our perceptions of the likelihood that a policy will need to make different decisions with respect to the sub-services. Further analysis is required to determine which of the currently de&ted permissions are really necessary to support the policies of interest to users.
Finally, the DTOS architecture has the advantage that a system with a new high-level policy may be implemented merely by substituting a security server that implements a new decision policy. In assuring this new system policy we do not need to redo analysis that has already been Performed upon the manager for the assurance of other policies.
